www.TheDefiningTension.com

[No. 9] --- Breaking News --- Mark The Date! --- Inaugural Lecture of Prof. Steven Hijink ---

This Friday at 16.00 hrs (Amsterdam time) sharp in the aula at the Erasmus School of Law, my colleague Prof. Steven Hijink will give his inaugural lecture titled:

'Naar een Europees Jaarrekeningrecht".*

See you there? See you there!

* Pretty roughly translated: towards  European annual account law.

[No. 61] The One-Tier Board

This Tuesday at 16.00 hrs. sharp, Willem Calkoen - a seasoned corporate law practitioner - will defend his doctoral thesis on the one-tier board in the aula of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. His book focuses on this board type in the US, the UK and the Netherlands, also from a cultural perspective (the subject water management even pops-up) and against the backdrop of the changing and internationally converging principles of corporate governance. As I am on the committee, and scheduled to question Willem during Tuesdays session, I will not dive into specifics here about the book. Suffice it to say that the book, written in English, offers interested readers many insights into board dynamics from not just the one-tier angle, but also the two-tier perspective. See you this Tuesday at 16.00 hrs. in the aula?

[No. 56] Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Law

So I got a mail from Prof. Theo Raaijmakers the other day, with the request to participate in a conference in honor of Delaware Chancery Court's Chancellor Leo Strine, who is this year's Anton Philips Professor.

It did not take long for me to respond with a firm 'thank you and yes please'. Not only did I work at the Chancery Court in the second half of 2008 for Leo Strine (those days when the credit crunch kicked-in and Obama got elected, remember?), the theme of the day - fiduciary duties in corporate law and all that - is quite interesting as well.

So here is the schedule for the conference, that will take place on November 4, 2011 in Tilburg. There are big names on the ticket, including Prof. Vino Timmerman (Takeovers and Proxy Voting) and TDT's very own Michael Schouten (ditto). I will be talking from the Dutch angle about director's liability vis-a-vis the company (section 2:9 DCC), fiduciary duties and - introduction of a Dutch version of - the business judgment rule, sometime after Leo Strine's inaugural speech and before lunch.

The Anton Philips Fund is organizing a Conference on Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Law in honor of Leo E. Strine, Anton Philips Professor at Tilburg University (2011-2012).
The event will be held at Tilburg University on November 4, 2011.

The Annual Anton Philips Inaugural Address will take place at 10.15 sharp in the Auditorium of Tilburg University.
Professor Leo E. Strine, Chancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court and Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, will deliver his inaugural address titled The Logical, but often Overlooked, Consequences of Corporate Governance reform and Prior Judicial Decisions for Current Corporate Litigation.

Upon the conclusion of Professor Leo Strine’s inaugural lecture, there will be a conference on Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Law. The conference will be divided in three panels.
The first panel, chaired by Theo Raaijmakers, will focus on Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities of Directors and Officers with paper presentations by Bastiaan Assink and Huub Willems.

After lunch the second panel, chaired by Joseph McCahery, will focus on Takeovers and Proxy Voting, with paper presentations by Vino Timmerman, Michael Schouten and Theo Raaijmakers.

The final panel, chaired by Leo Strine, will be on EU Takeover Regulation with paper presentations by Alessio Pacces, Joseph McCahery and Jaap Winter.

The morning session will be held in the Auditorium of Tilburg University. The afternoon session, to be held in the Dante Building, will be finished at 17.00h with drinks in the foyer.

Attendance is free of charge. More information on the registration for these events you can find in the practical information.

Attendance is free of charge. For online registration go here.

[No. 46] Relying on Information in Fulfilling Directors' Duties

Tomorrow at 11.30 hrs sharp, Maarten Mussche wil defend his PhD thesis on Relying on Information in Fulfilling Directors' Duties.  A business edition of the thesis will be published in the "Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht" series as nr. 83. His thesis not only focuses on Dutch, American and German corporate law, but also on criminal law and - shocker - notions from the law & economics realm. I will be one of the professors "questioning" Maarten tomorrow, but of course I cannot disclose my question(s) at this time. After all, as one can read here (a link to a legal "glossy" (no kidding)) Maarten is a regular reader of this blog.

[No. 36] Responsible Shareholdership

On September 16, the Center for European Company Law will host a conference on responsible shareholdership. The conference - that will take place in Leiden - features interesting speakers, including scholars and practitioners from the States (Robert Monks), Belgium (Koen Geens), Germany (Holger Fleischer), England (Iris Chiu), Greece (Pavlos Masouros) and the Netherlands (Matthijs de Jongh, Steef Bartman and Jaap Winter). Lawyers attending the event can even add 4 educational points to their list. Looks like a pretty promising ticket to me.

[No. 13] Exit remedies for minority shareholders in close companies. England, the United States, China

On Thursday (20 January 2011) Ms. Qiuju Wang will defend her PhD-thesis entitled "Exit remedies for minority shareholders in close companies. England, the United States, China". The defense, which is open to the public, will take place at 16.15 uur, Academiegebouw, Broerstraat 5, Groningen. Promotors are professors J.B. Wezeman and M.L. Lennarts.

Here's an English summary of her thesis:

Worldwide, the topic of protection of minority shareholders gains much attention. One of the protective mechanisms minority shareholders may use is the exit remedy. This remedy is helpful for minority shareholders, especially those in close companies because shareholders in such companies can not exit at will like shareholders in a listed company. In this comparative study two exit remedies are examined, namely the appraisal remedy and the oppression remedy/unfair prejudice remedy. The comparative research includes the laws of the UK, the US and China.

China is a most attractive destination of foreign direct investment. As foreign invested enterprises in China usually take the form of close companies, a comparative study with the aim to improve protection of minority shareholders by adopting experiences from leading jurisdictions will benefit both foreign investors and China’s economic development.

Under the new PRC Company Law 2006, both the appraisal remedy and the oppression remedy have been introduced, but they are embryonic and there is plenty of room for improvement. Regarding the appraisal remedy, a number of recommendations are made in this study, covering both substantive and procedural issues. With regard to the oppression remedy, it is concluded in this study that the current provisions in the 2006 PRC Company Law are unlikely to be effective. Therefore fundamental reform is proposed, adopting elements from the UK and US laws on oppression remedies. Adoption of this proposal will lead to a significant improvement in the protection of minority shareholders in Chinese close companies. As a result China will become a more attractive destination for international investors.

[No. 196] Inaugural lecture of Prof. mr. J.H.M. Willems

On November 30, 2010, at 16.15 hrs. sharp, Huub Willems - the former president of the Dutch Enterprise Chamber - will deliver his inaugural lecture as professor of corporate litigation at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. The location is Academiegebouw, Broerstraat 5, Groningen.

All we know for now is the title of his lecture: "Van Groeningen naar Groningen, over litigation en legislation" (from Groeningen to Groningen, about litigation and legislation). So, we can expect something about judges and other lawmakers.

'Groeningen', by the way, is the building next to the Amsterdam Court of Appeals where (some of) the judges and the administration of the Enterprise Chamber reside.

[No. 185] Basel III and Basic Corporate Finance

Simon Johnson, editor of a highly recommendable weblog (www.thebaselinescenario.com), drew my attention to an interesting letter published in the Financial Times concerning the reform of the capital requirements for banks (Basel III). The letter has been written by a significant amount of academic experts that argue that the proposed regulation fails to eliminate the key structural flaws in the current system. The banking lobby argues that by requiring banks to hold more capital, the economy will be hurt and growth will be undermined. The academic experts beg to differ, based on surprisingly basic and fundamental concepts, that everyone who ever took a foundation course in corporate finance ought to know:

“Some claim that requiring more equity lowers the banks’ return on equity and increases their overall funding costs. This claim reflects a basic fallacy. Using more equity changes how risk and reward are divided between equity holders and debt holders, but does not by itself affect funding costs.”

Remember Modigliani & Miller? The capital structure of a firm is irrelevant to its value. However, because interest is tax-deductible, leveraging can create value. The experts:

“Tax codes that provide advantages to debt financing over equity encourage banks to borrow too much. It is paradoxical to subsidize debt that generates systemic risk and then regulate to try to limit debt. Debt and equity should at least compete on even terms.”

The experts point to the (also very basic) moral hazard problem inherent to the use of too much leverage:

“High leverage encourages excessive risk taking and any guarantees exacerbate this problem. If banks use significantly more equity funding, there will be less risk taking at the expense of creditors or governments.”

The experts also don't shy away from the political dimension of the Basel III discussion:

“Many bankers oppose increased equity requirements, possibly because of a vested interest in the current systems of subsidies and compensation. But the policy goal must be a healthier banking system, rather than high returns for banks’ shareholders and managers, with taxpayers picking up losses and economies suffering the fallout.”

As Simon Johnson notes, the fact that so many important scholars are weighing in on the debate and basically are telling the bank officials that their analysis is just wrong, is pretty huge. The experts’ main point, that “ensuring that banks are funded with significantly more equity should be a key element of effective bank regulatory reform”, is supported by a recent paper that is prepared to be published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives. Let's see what effect these academic efforts will have on the proposal.

[No. 182] Cooperation in Corporate Law

Next Friday and Saturday, November 12-13, the Institute for Corporate Law will organize a - fully sold-out - conference on cooperation in corporate law (Samen Werken in het Ondernemingsrecht).

The cooperation theme will be approached from multiple angles, including:

• cooperation within the legal entity;
• cooperation within the board;
• cooperation with and between shareholders;
• cooperation with the workers council;
• cooperation within supervision;
• M&A in the post-crisis era;
• cooperation and the role of articles of association and shareholders agreements;
• cooperation and competition law; and
• joint-ventures and annual accounts.

I am going to cover the "cooperation within the board" angle, touching on some behavioral/social psychology issues. Should lead to an interesting plenary discussion, to be published in 2011.

Anyway, hope to see you there. For the Dutch readers not yet familiar with the program, here is the line-up.

IVO-congres Samen Werken in het Ondernemingsrecht

Congresvoorzitters:
Prof. mr. M.J. Kroeze en Prof. mr. J.B. Wezeman

Programma vrijdag 12 november 2010

14.00 Ontvangst, koffie en thee 

14.25 precies Opening door de voorzitter Prof. mr. J.B. Wezeman (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)

14.30-15.00 De rechtspersoon als samenwerkingsvorm, Prof. mr. L. Timmerman, Advocaat-Generaal bij de Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, hoogleraar Grondslagen van het ondernemingsrecht, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam

15.00-15.30 Samenwerking in het bestuur (in de one tier en two tier board), Prof. mr. B.F. Assink, hoogleraar Ondernemingsrecht, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, advocaat te Amsterdam

15.30-16.00 Eerste discussieronde 

16.00-16.30 Pauze  

16.30-17.00 Samenwerking met en tussen aandeelhouders, Prof. mr. J.W. Winter, hoogleraar Corporate Governance, Duisenberg school of finance, hoogleraar European company law, Universiteit van Amsterdam, advocaat te Amsterdam

17.00-17.30 Samenwerking met de ondernemingsraad, Prof. mr. L.G. Verburg, hoogleraar Arbeidsrecht, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, advocaat te Amsterdam

17.30-18.00 Samenwerken in het toezicht, Prof. mr. H.M. Vletter-van Dort, hoogleraar Bank- en effectenrecht, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, hoogleraar Effectenrecht Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

18.00-18.30 Tweede discussieronde

19.00-22.00 Aperitief en diner (locatie: Ni Hao, Ged. Kattendiep 122, 9711 PV Groningen)

Programma zaterdag 13 november 2010

09.00 Ontvangst, koffie en thee 

09.25 Opening door de voorzitter, Prof. mr. M.J. Kroeze (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

09.30-10.00 Fusies en overnames in het post-crisis tijdperk, Mr. drs. H.H.Kersten, advocaat te Amsterdam

10.00-10.30 Samenwerking: statuten en/of aandeelhoudersovereenkomst, Prof. mr. W.J.M. van Veen, hoogleraar Vennootschaps- en rechtspersonenrecht, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, senior legal counsel te Amsterdam 

10.30-10.45 Pauze  

10.45-11.15 Samenwerking en mededinging, Mr. P. Glazener, advocaat te Amsterdam

11.15-11.45 Joint ventures en jaarrekening, Prof. mr. H. Beckman, hoogleraar Jaarrekeningrecht, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam en Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, advocaat te Amsterdam

11.45-12.30 Discussieronde

12.30 Lunch(pakket)

Congreslocatie:

PATHĖ GRONINGEN
Ged. Zuiderdiep 78
9711 HL Groningen

Zie voor routebeschrijving: www.pathe.nl/groningen

[No. 180] Eumedion Conference on Stewardship

I'm off to Rotterdam this afternoon to attend a conference organised by Eumedion, which operates as a representative of the interests of institutional investors in the field of corporate governance. Eumedion speaks on behalf of virtually all of the major Dutch and non-Dutch institutional investors in Dutch listed firms, and over the years I've found it to be a tremendous source of knowledge and insight. Check out its website at http://www.eumedion.nl/English and sign up for the monthly newsletter if you want to stay up to speed on regulatory and market developments in the Netherlands and in Europe.

This afternoon's conference will address the issue of effective communication between institutional investors and their portfolio firms. Much of the communication takes place behind the scenes, which is why you don't read too much about this in academic journals (for a great exception, see here) and why it's so interesting to visit conferences attended by issuers and investors who talk about the issues they encounter in practice.

[No. 176] Evolution of Director Liability Law

Yesterday's symposium was a success with a stacked auditorium of 170+ participants, a solid panel and fruitful discussions.

Many thanks to all those who attended the event, and especially those of you who got involved in the debate.

The material and the report of the two discussion sessions will be published soon.

[No. 168] Hijink on Issuer Disclosure Requirements

On Wednesday (13 October 2010) my friend Steven Hijink will defend his PhD-thesis entitled "Issuer Disclosure Requirements" (Publicatieverplichtingen voor beursvennootschappen). The defense, which is open to the public, will take place at noon in the auditorium of the University of Amsterdam at Singel 411 and will be followed by a reception.

Steven's promoter is Prof. Jaap Winter (who is my intended promoter as well), and his thesis committee includes, among others, profs. Eddy Wymeersch (the head of the European securities regulator), Harm-Jan de Kluiver and Jan Berend Wezeman.

Here's an English summary of his thesis, which will be published in full by Kluwer:

The subject of this study

Listed companies – companies whose shares, bonds, or depositary receipts for shares or bonds have been admitted for trading on the securities market – are obliged to publish a considerable amount of information. Publishing this information results on the one hand in costs for the listed companies while, on the other hand, it is not clear what the revenues are from imposing such obligations to publish. This study examines what the aims and principles are for imposing disclosure requirements on listed companies and whether these requirements have been designed efficiently and cost-effectively.

The disclosure requirements for listed companies are examined against the background that a strong connection exists between the law and reality which the law aims to regulate. One of the assumptions in this study is that company law and securities law must to some extent have the ability to adapt – the ability to adapt successfully to a changing reality. Developments of legal systems, and thus also of company and securities law, are consequently affected by  “regulatory competition” and “path dependency”. This has consequences for the disclosure requirements for listed companies, which are incorporated in company law and securities law. Another basic assumption of this study is that company law and securities law have an instrumental function. The regulations in these legal areas can be seen as instruments for influencing the behaviour of people involved in various capacities in listed companies and securities markets.

 What makes the disclosure requirements for listed companies so special is the fact that they are partly incorporated in company law and partly in securities law. There does not appear to be a systematic allocation, however. Due to the increasing cross-border nature of the regulation of listed companies and the development of “the” legislation of states into a competition factor for attracting listed companies’ businesses or investments, the importance of a systematic and internationally justified allocation between company law and securities law of the disclosure requirements for listed companies is growing. At the same time, this allocation between the legal areas and the distinction between them is influenced by the aims and functions of the disclosure requirements.

This study has four parts. The research method in the first three parts consists of comparative law and law and economics analyses. The starting point in the fourth part is positive Dutch law. As regards the comparative law component, particular attention is given to the main features of European regulations and legislation in the United States.

[No. 105] Doctoral Dissertation: The Legal Position of the Internal Auditor in the Netherlands

June, 10 at 13:30, Louis de Bruijn will defend his doctoral dissertation at the Erasmus School of Law (Supervisors: prof. H. Beckman and prof. J.B. Wezeman).

The dissertation of De Bruijn deals with the legal position of the internal auditor in the Netherlands. Recent corporate scandals involving false accounting and corporate fraud led to increased attention for the position of the internal auditor. De Bruijn describes in his study that for a number of issues it is not clearly defined what rules apply for auditors. De Bruijn advocates a standard description of the duties and powers of the auditor. Furthermore, he explains that it is important that the organizational independence for the internal auditor is properly secured, whereby the existing (legal) rules have to be supplemented with measures by the organization. Lastly, it is mentioned that it is important to regulate the power to conduct investigations, especially in cases where resistance exists to internal investigations in an organization.

[No. 104] Socially Responsible Entrepreneurship

This Friday, at the annual meeting of the Nederlandse Juristen Vereniging, the five authors of the 2010 NVJ Preadviezen on socially responsible entrepreneurship will present and defend their respective contributions in a session that will last a whopping seven hours (10-17 hrs.; ok, with a few breaks and a lunch).

We highlighted one part of the Preadviezen, authored by friends of TDT Matthijs de Jong, Alexander Schild and Vino Timmerman, several times and lastly in post No. 94/10. Abstracts of the two other parts are available here and here, by A.J.A.J. Eijsbouts and F.G.H. Kristen respectively.

To give you something of a teaser, here's the summary of the whole project.

Samenvatting preadvies 2010 Eijsbouts, Kristen, De Jongh, Schild, Timmerman: Maatschappelijk (verantwoord) ondernemen. Naast, in of met recht?

Algemeen Deel A.J.A.J. Eijsbouts, F.G.H. Kristen, J.M. de Jongh, A.J.P. Schild en L. Timmerman Maatschappelijk (verantwoord) ondernemen: naast, in of met recht? Het overkoepelende thema van de preadviezen 2010 is Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen (MVO). Het gebied dat MVO inhoudelijk beslaat, wordt veelal samengevat onder het begrip Triple P (People, Planet en Profit). In het Algemeen Deel en in hun individuele preadviezen benaderen de preadviseurs het multidisciplinaire onderwerp MVO vanuit een juridisch perspectief. De relatie tussen MVO en recht is niet vanzelfsprekend. MVO is een dynamisch begrip en wordt veelal als bovenwettelijk aangemerkt, zoals door kabinet en SER. De preadviseurs kunnen zich hierin op hoofdlijnen verenigen in die zin dat zij onderschrijven dat het recht niet als de primaire bron van normen en waarborgen voor MVO kan dienen. Niet alleen kan het recht, gelet op de aard van MVO, die rol niet afdoende vervullen. Het kan daarnaast ook ongewenst zijn het recht, voor zover het die rol wel zou kunnen vervullen, die rol ook inderdaad toe te kennen. Eigen verantwoordelijkheid blijft op het gebied van MVO de belangrijkste basis. Het overheidsbeleid is er dan ook op gericht het nemen van deze verantwoordelijkheid voor MVO te bevorderen. Tegelijkertijd moet worden onderkend dat MVO-normen kunnen zijn vervat in juridische voorschriften. Er bestaat inmiddels een reguleringsmix: ongeschreven normen, al dan niet met juridische relevantie, zelfregulering, soft law en/of hard law. Ter duiding van MVO wordt in het Algemeen Deel ingegaan op verschijningsvormen van MVO, de internationale en de Europese dimensie van MVO en de sectorale benadering van MVO in de Triple P-gebieden. Daarbij wordt ingegaan op ontwikkelingen in de voor MVO relevante algemene rechtsgebieden, in het bijzonder ondernemingsrecht en strafrecht, waarbij ook vormen van alternatieve regulering worden betrokken. Deze globale verkenning brengt de preadviseurs tot twee te onderscheiden definities van MVO: als normatief begrip en als operationeel begrip. Deze definities vormen het uitgangspunt voor de preadviseurs in hun preadviezen. In de normatieve definitie van MVO beschouwen de preadviseurs MVO als een dynamisch containerbegrip. Het omvat normen in verschillende verschijningsvormen: niet-gecodificeerde maatschappelijke normen, collectieve en individuele zelfregulering, soft law en hard law. Ongeacht hun verschijningsvorm zien de normen op de maatschappelijke gevolgen van het ondernemen door de ondernemer, zoals gevolgen op economisch, mensenrechtelijk en sociaal vlak alsook het milieu. Deze MVO-normen kunnen rechtens effect hebben, ook al zijn zij niet vervat in hard law. De rechter kan daaraan betekenis toekennen bij de invulling van open normen, zoals de redelijkheid en billijkheid, de opvattingen in het maatschappelijke verkeer en, in het ondernemingsrecht, elementaire beginselen van verantwoord ondernemerschap. Daarmee rekenen de preadviseurs zowel het bovenwettelijke als het wettelijke normenkader op de sectorale Triple P-gebieden en op de algemene rechtsgebieden, tot het MVO-begrip in normatieve zin. Deze naar tijd en plaats veranderlijke en normen behelzen tezamen de licence to operate voor de ondernemer. Daarnaast wordt een korte beschrijving gegeven van MVO als operationeel begrip. Daarbij gaat het om de best practices, waarmee de ondernemer de MVO-normen tot gelding laat komen in zijn ondernemen. Die best practices kunnen ook een rol spelen bij de beoordeling door de rechter of het ondernemen geschiedt in overeenstemming met die normen uit de normatieve MVO-definitie, waaraan rechtens betekenis toekomt. Niet minder belangrijk en vaak zeker niet minder effectief kunnen deze best practices ook een rol spelen bij de beoordeling van ondernemen door de courts of public opinion. Die beoordeling kan dan weer op haar beurt rechtens relevant worden. Tot slot volgt een korte inleiding op het onderwerp van het derde preadvies, de maatschappelijke onderneming. Ook voor maatschappelijke ondernemingen geldt vanzelfsprekend dat zij de algemene MVO-normen tot gelding laten komen in hun ondernemen.

If you're eager to visit the event next Friday, or if you just want a copy of the book, just follow the link and take it from there.

[No. 90] Towards a Community Interest Company in the Netherlands?

This post comes from

Alexander Schild and Matthijs de Jongh
Law clerks at the Dutch Supreme Court

1. The time one could recognize ‘do gooders’ on their sandals and pony tails are long gone. The concern for the wellbeing of all creatures inhabiting this planet has become a major theme in the public debate. The persons advocating its goals no longer wear flowers in their hair and have traded their peace slogans for science based ideas about how to move forward.

2. On the other side of the coin, business have adapted too. First, public opinion showed itself to be a powerful tool. The Brent Spar incident forced Shell into a humiliating change of plans. Next, green became the new cool. Starbucks not only brought decent coffee to the U.S. but also persuaded people to spend unprecedented amounts on a cup of coffee. Drinking coffee became an experience and respect for human rights and the environment were part of it. Customers walked out of the door feeling they contributed not only to their own well being but to the world as well.

3. In the wake of the boom of corporate responsibility a new type of company emerges. Nowadays more and more companies wanted to be associated with the idea of being in business ‘not just for profit’. Governments have been quick to size the moment. Private companies advancing public goals provides an opportunity to save tax payers money.

4. For social entrepreneurs – the MBA graduated iPhone wielding hippies of the modern age –  the idea of social entrepreneurship brings an opportunity to cloth themselves with a new identity. The credit crises bruised Mandeville’s fable of the bees. The idea that the public good is best served if every member of society pursues its own interests has proved to be flawed. Working for a business advancing a public cause instead of for a bonus is recognized by the young professional as an opportunity to combine smart and cool. Social entrepreneurship provides a useful social label. The ‘community interest company’ provides the legal means to be able to ‘show off’ the difference to yesteryears’ companies in the market place.

5. So what does a ‘community interest company’ – as it is called in the UK – stand apart from other companies? A community interest company is a private company, which conducts a business or other activity for a community benefit, and not purely for private advantage. Community interest companies engage in a wide range of activities. They explore airports or railways, manage hospitals or run a housing corporation. Community interest companies also engage in local social entrepreneurship by running day centers for elderly people or a restaurant whose guests are served by disabled people suffering from the Down’s syndrome. They can also run an ‘ordinary’ business to generate profits to support activities which benefit the community.

6. Does the Netherlands need a community interest company? In 2009, the Dutch government has proposed to Parliament to introduce a new legal form (the “maatschappelijke onderneming”) for community interest companies. This bill has been widely criticized as being unnecessary and inflexible. According to the bill, a “maatschappelijke onderneming” shall be incorporated as a foundation or an association with special additional features in order to guarantee that the enterprise is conducted for the benefit of the community. These features include a mandatory supervisory board and a council in which interested parties can raise their voice and have certain control rights. The bill proposes that third parties may invest in social enterprises, but it limits their control and dividend rights.

7. On its annual meeting of 2010, the Dutch Lawyers Association will discuss whether a legal form for community interest companies is desirable, and, if so, how it should be designed. Vino Timmerman (Attorney General at the Supreme Court), Alexander Schild and Matthijs de Jongh (law clerks at the Dutch Supreme Court) have written a paper (summary in Dutch), on the basis of which the Lawyers Association will discuss this matter. We invite all readers to comment on the paper, so that the discussion can start well before the meeting on June 11, 2010!

8. The paper is structured as follows. Part I discusses two inherently conflicting elements of social enterprises: its community purpose and its commercial character. This internal conflict of interest can threaten the community purpose and may result in a lack of internal control of the board and, consequently, in significant agency costs. A new bill needs to tackle these issues, while remaining attractive for investors. Part II deals with the pending bill and its history and gives an overview of critics. Part III compares different community interest companies abroad: the Low-profit Limited Liability Company (L3C), which has been recently introduced in several States of the USA, the British Community Interest Company (CIC) and the Belgian Company with a Social Purpose (Vennootschap met Sociaal Oogmerk).

9. In Part IV, we argue that there is a case for community interest companies in the Netherlands. We endorse the statement by (Nobel Prize winner) Muhammad Yunus that we must make social business entrepreneurs and social business investors visible in the market place. A legal form which distinguishes social enterprises from ordinary businesses, which is sufficiently attractive for investors while assuring the advancement of the social purpose, may well promote social entrepreneurship in The Netherlands.

10. However, our proposal significantly differs from the pending bill. Rather, we gain inspiration from the British CIC. We argue that not only associations and foundations should be able to organize as a community interest company, but also private and public limited liability companies, as well as cooperatives. Unlike the pending bill, we do not favor a limitation of investor control rights, nor a mandatory supervisory board nor a council of interested parties. To the extent possible, community interest companies should be organized as normal companies.

11. In order to ensure that the company is set up for the community and that its assets and profits are dedicated to the community, we propose that a community interest company should be approved by a public regulator. Like the British CIC Regulator, the supervisor’s role should normally be a passive one and limited to the approval of community interest companies. It should not envisage pro-active supervision of individual companies. In case of abuse, however, the supervisor should be able to take a more active approach in order to ensure that the company will take into account its community purpose. We argue that a form of light touch supervision will enable a more flexible legal form, rather than the current one size fits all-bill, which is not suitable for small social entrepreneurs.

12. Like the British CIC, we also propose a mandatory asset lock in order to ensure that the company’s assets are used for the benefit of the community. Amongst others, the asset lock should set a maximum for dividend payments to shareholders, while ensuring that the company remains sufficiently attractive for investors. For instance, the current dividend cap for British CIC’s is set on 20% of the paid-up value of a share and the maximum aggregate dividend limit of the total dividend declared is 35% of the distributable profits.

13. We conclude that the public interest may benefit from a new brand for community interest companies which not only provides sufficient warranties against abuse, but is also flexible and attractive for investors.

[No. 20] Timing is Everything, Right?

Okay, so in Post No. 221/09 I wrote the following about the bill on private company law reform, an important chunk of legislation practitioners in business and law have  been quite eagerly waiting for for some years now.

We've been discussing the reshaping of Dutch corporate law in the field of private companies several times (see, e.g., here with links). Now that the first tranche of the legislation process in parliament has been completed (the Second Chamber has accepted the proposal with some amendments), the waiting is for the second and last tranche, to be completed by the First Chamber (that chamber can only say yes or no, it cannot amend); if the process is picked-up and completed before April 1, 2010, the expectation is that the new regime for private companies will be operational as of July 1, 2010. So we're actually getting somewhere here, or so it seems.

Uhm, or not.

Apparently, the committee on justice of the First Chamber of parliament seems to be delaying discussions on the bill, because the Ministry of Justice doesn't provide the full text of this bill and of others (especially some tax stuff). By delaying discussions on this bill, the committee is putting pressure on the ministry to come forward with the full text of bills in the future, when requested. The committee now, again: apparently, is aiming at continuing discussions on the bill in April 2010, but this may well also depend on the way the quarrel with the ministry turns out.

Huh? Well, that's a weird twist, I guess timing isn't everything always. To be sure, for you sceptics out there, I'm not making this up. Here's the key part from the notes by the "Vergadering van de vaste commissie voor Justitie" (roughly: the meeting of the regular committee on Justice) of February 2, 2010, confirming this course of events.

Via ambtelijke weg is begrepen dat het ministerie van Justitie geen doorlopende wettekst zal verstrekken met betrekking tot de wetsvoorstellen 28746 Vaststelling van titel 7.13 (vennootschap) van het Burgerlijk Wetboek 31065 Aanpassing van de wetgeving aan en invoering van titel 7.13 (vennootschap) van het Burgerlijk Wetboek (Invoeringswet titel 7.13 Burgerlijk Wetboek) en 31058 Wijziging van Boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met de aanpassing van de regeling voor besloten vennootschappen met beperkte aansprakelijkheid (Wet vereenvoudiging en flexibilisering bv-recht). De commissie wil - gelet op het feit dat eerder in andere commissies soortgelijke verzoeken zijn afgewezen - aan het College van Senioren het verzoek voorleggen dat de Voorzitter in overleg treedt met de regering om de toezegging te verkrijgen dat in voorkomende gevallen wel aan zo’n verzoek om een doorlopende wettekst gehoor zal worden gegeven. Vooralsnog wordt het voorbereidend onderzoek met betrekking tot de twee laatstgenoemde wetsvoorstellen opgeschort.

How about them apples?

July 1, 2010 as "D-day" for the bill to become operational seems less and less likely. Maybe, just maybe, 2011 is doable. Aah, the surprises of the legislative process...

[No. 19] The Big Blame Game [Updated II]

Post No. 17/10 had some nice authentic footage of Nout Wellink, giving his personal perspective on the credit crunch to the Committee De Wit.

Yesterday former ABN Amro CEO Rijkman Groenink came by, with a somewhat different appreciation of the course of events, including the hotly debated ABN Amro takeover (c.q. debacle). He, in turn, was followed today by Nout Wellink (who wasn't very impressed by Groenink's story) and Minister of Finance Wouter Bos (ditto). For a reaction by Groenink, go here.

The red thread of the sessions? You guessed it, bickering, bickering, bickering, with one bottom line: nobody is going to say sorry here, despite the attempts by the Committee De Wit in that direction. We're in "blame the other guy" land here. Instructive and entertaining nonetheless. Can't we do this for another week or so?

For live reports of the committee sessions - unfortunately no footage, only written stuff, but on a realtime basis - go here (and check the right side bar, it's self-explanatory).

UPDATE I

Although - well, just maybe - not wholly appropriate to mention in this post, I'm doing it anyway: here's a recent publication by Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann about Regulating Banker's Pay.

UPDATE II

And now even the Committee De Wit itself is target of criticism, labeled by some as incompetent

Kamerleden zonder enige expertise bevragen betrokkenen die hun hele leven al in de financiële sector rondlopen. Die komen dan ook vreselijk makkelijk weg. Terwijl ze net zolang op hun huid gezeten moeten worden, totdat ze zeggen: ‘Hier kan ik niet op antwoorden.’ Alleen Jolande Sap van GroenLinks is in staat vervolgvragen te stellen. Dat zij het kundig doet, komt doordat ze econome is. Maar zo’n Dion Graus van de PVV: beschamend. In het gesprek met oud-Rabo-topman Bert Heemskerk zei Graus letterlijk: ‘Niets is onmogelijk, dat blijkt wel uit de crisis.’ Dat is kennelijk zijn niveau van expertise.’

and by others as way too focused on finishing the prepared Q&A, not on key issues that came up during the sessions but weren't part of the rehearsed Q&A.

De commissie is intens tevreden. Hoofdrolspelers nog eens horen, maar dan onder ede, vinden de commissieleden niet nodig. Alles wat ze wilden horen, hebben ze gehoord, zeggen ze. De vragenlijst is geheel afgewerkt.

We'll see what comes out of the committee's findings, but it won't be a shocker to anyone if its finger points in the direction of De Nederlandsche Bank and its president.

[No. 17] And Now It Was the DNB's President Turn - Hindsight Bias, Anyone?

I believe Nout Wellink's answers and explanations were pretty solid actually, despite all the criticism against DNB's supervision activities in the past days. Go here and here for earlier posts at TDT about the Committee De Wit, that is diving into the questions how the credit crunch could happen and how a new one can be prevented (well, more or less). Snippets of the "Wellink session" are available directly below.

[No. 15] Deadlocks and Responsibility in Inquiry Proceedings

Today at 16.15 hrs CET, Frank Veenstra will defend his PhD thesis on deadlocks and responsibility in inquiry proceedings at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen.

Veenstra basically focuses on two issues:

1. Whether the right of inquiry is suited to deal with, and solve, deadlock cases in 50/50 situations (typically in small private companies).
2. Whether, and if so to what extent, remarks by the Enterprise Chamber in inquiry proceedings - that do not deal with personal liability of directors - about responsibility of directors for certain misconduct may play a role in subsequent liability proceedings. that are brought before a different court.

The first issue, I believe, hasn't really been a big issue in the past years. Many cases before the Enterprise Chamber exactly deal with these 50/50 deadlock type of controversies (around 94% of the cases involve private companies), and the court seems to be handling them in a pretty efficient manner. The second issue was a fairly big issue in the 90s following the Supreme Court's Ogem Holding decision (January 10, 1990, NJ 1990, 466), until the Supreme Court rendered its 2005 Laurus decision that aimed to clarify things and took much - granted: not all - of the initial concerns away. Here's the money quote.

3.7 (...) Zoals de Hoge Raad in zijn beschikking van 27 september 2000, nr. OK 80, NJ 2000, 653, heeft geoordeeld, houdt het in de wet vastgelegde stelsel van het recht van enquête twee afzonderlijke procedures in (in HR 6 juni 2003, nr. R 02/078, NJ 2003, 486 ook aangeduid als: twee fasen). Wat betreft de tweede procedure, waarin de ondernemingskamer, indien uit het verslag van de door haar benoemde onderzoekers van wanbeleid is gebleken (art. 2:355 BW), de in art. 2:356 BW genoemde voorzieningen kan treffen, heeft de Hoge Raad in zijn beschikking van 10 januari 1990, nr. 21, NJ 1990, 466, overwogen dat de vaststelling van de ondernemingskamer dat van wanbeleid sprake is - behoudens cassatie - bindend is, ook in andere procedures, voor diegenen die in de tweede procedure zijn verschenen en òfwel tot toewijzing van hetgeen verzocht en/of gevorderd is hebben geconcludeerd òfwel daartegen verweer hebben gevoerd, zonder dat daarmee tevens is vastgesteld of en in hoeverre dit wanbeleid aan die individuele verweerder kan worden verweten en deze daarvoor aansprakelijk kan worden gesteld (rov. 5). De Hoge Raad overwoog tevens dat het begrip "wanbeleid" in art. 2:355 BW kennelijk betrekking heeft op wanbeleid van de rechtspersoon, en dat wanbeleid van de organen van een rechtspersoon of degenen die daarvan deel uitmaken, aan de rechtspersoon moet worden toegerekend (rov. 7.4).

3.8 Deze overwegingen dienen als volgt te worden verstaan. Indien personen die deel uitmaken van de organen van de rechtspersoon door derden die als gevolg van wanbeleid schade hebben geleden aansprakelijk worden gesteld in een afzonderlijke, op art. 6:74 en/of art. 6:162 en/of art. 2:138/248 BW gebaseerde, procedure, is de vaststelling van de ondernemingskamer dat van wanbeleid van de onderzochte rechtspersoon sprake is - behoudens cassatie - weliswaar bindend voor diegenen die in de tweede procedure van de enquête zijn verschenen en ofwel tot toewijzing van hetgeen verzocht en/of gevorderd is hebben geconcludeerd ofwel daartegen verweer hebben gevoerd, maar dit impliceert niet de persoonlijke aansprakelijkheid van de leden van de organen van de rechtspersoon voor dat wanbeleid. De door de ondernemingskamer vastgestelde feiten staan in een aansprakelijkheidsprocedure ook niet op voorhand vast, zelfs niet behoudens tegenbewijs. Het oordeel van de ondernemingskamer dat van wanbeleid sprake is geweest, kan daarin onder omstandigheden wel de bewijsrechtelijke betekenis hebben dat de rechter, mede gelet op de inhoud van het door de onderzoekers opgestelde verslag en het daarover in de tweede procedure van de enquête gevoerde debat, voorshands bewezen acht dat de aangesproken persoon tegenover de rechtspersoon zijn taak niet heeft vervuld op de wijze waarop een redelijk bekwame en redelijk handelende functionaris die taak in de gegeven omstandigheden had behoren te vervullen.

Anyway, here's the abstract of the research, which provides nice insights in a lot of case law and is a welcome contribution to the book series of the Institute for Corporate Law.

Hoewel de enquêteprocedure hiervoor niet is bedoeld, wordt zij veelvuldig aangewend ter doorbreking van impasses tussen aandeelhouders van kleine vennootschappen tussen wie de verhoudingen ernstig en blijvend zijn verstoord. In deze uitgave is onderzocht of de enquêteprocedure gelet op haar aard, inrichting en de bevoegdheden van de Ondernemingskamer geschikt is om deze impasses te doorbreken. De Ondernemingskamer heeft voorts in verschillende enquêteprocedures het handelen van de afzonderlijke functionarissen beoordeeld. Hierop is in de literatuur kritisch gereageerd. Gevreesd wordt dat de desbetreffende overwegingen belangrijke betekenis kunnen hebben in latere aansprakelijkheidsprocedures, hetgeen bezwaarlijk wordt geacht omdat de enquêteprocedure slechts één feitelijke instantie kent terwijl de onderzoeksfase niet van bijzondere procesrechtelijke waarborgen is voorzien. In deze uitgave is onderzocht op welke wijze en in welke mate de overwegingen van de Ondernemingskamer kunnen doorwerken in aansprakelijkheidsprocedures.

[No. 9] The Janus Head of Corporate Law

From the (Dutch) EUR press release issued today:

Oratie Mr. dr. B.F. Assink

Titel oratie
'De Januskop van het ondernemingsrecht - Over faciliëren en reguleren van ondernemerschap'

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Leerstoel:
Ondernemingsrecht

Datum
21 januari 2010 11:00

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Locatie:
Woudestein, aula

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Faculteit
Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid (FR)

Ondernemingsrecht moet transparant en voorspelbaar

Rechters dienen ondernemingsrecht gestructureerd vorm te geven

Voor ondernemers is het belangrijk dat het ondernemingsrecht helder en transparant is. Rechters hebben hierin een belangrijke taak: niet zozeer de wetgever, maar zíj moeten vooral het voor de dagelijkse praktijk relevante ondernemingsrecht gestructureerder gaan vormgeven. Dit stelt prof.mr. Bastiaan F. Asssink in zijn oratie 'De Januskop van het ondernemingsrecht - Over faciliëren en reguleren van ondernemerschap', waarmee hij op donderdag 21 januari 2010 zijn leerstoel Ondernemingsrecht aanvaardt in de Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid.

In zijn rede slaat Assink de brug tussen ondernemerschap en ondernemingsrecht.
Assink ziet ondernemerschap als een complexe zaak. De ondernemer moet via innovatieve activiteiten waarde zien te creëren, maar tegelijkertijd tussen vele regels en wetten manoeuvreren in een globaliserende wereld die steeds meer vergt, waarbij bovendien de foutentolerantie van de buitenwacht sterk afneemt.

Intussen wordt het ondernemingsrecht in toenemende mate onvoorspelbaar, omdat rechtsvragen steeds vaker aan de hand van de wisselende omstandigheden van het geval beantwoord dienen te worden door de rechter, waarbij deze zich bij voorkeur beperkt tot een zaaksgebonden beslissing.

Het ondernemingsrecht is volgens Assink te vergelijken met een Januskop, omdat het twee gezichten heeft. Aan de ene kant facilieert het ondernemingsrecht dat ondernemers economische bedrijvigheid kunnen ontplooien om waardevermeerdering te creëren. Aan de andere kant tracht het ondernemingsrecht het gedrag van betrokkenen te reguleren en waardevernietiging tegen te gaan.
Ondernemingsrecht kan niet zorgen voor succesvol ondernemingsbeleid – dat is des ondernemers – of een ‘betere’ wereld. Het kan wel zoveel mogelijk rekening houden met de complexiteit van ondernemerschap, door te bevorderen dat de Januskop daaraan zo min mogelijk bijdraagt. Hier valt een verbeterslag te maken.

Assink bepleit in zijn oratie als oplossingsrichting dat de rechter de complexiteit van het ondernemingsrecht actief tegengaat, door de eisen die het recht stelt aan de ondernemer gestructureerder uit te lichten, waardoor die eisen transparanter en voorspelbaarder worden. Hij onderbouwt zijn pleidooi met een voorstel tot vastere invulling van notoire grijze gebieden, waaronder het richtsnoer voor de ondernemer (het ‘belang van de vennootschap’) en de gevarenzone van bestuurdersaansprakelijkheid.

Over prof.mr. Bastiaan Assink
Assink richt zich aan de EUR, naast het onderwijs, op onderzoek naar gedragsnormering van actoren binnen vennootschap en onderneming. Hij promoveerde in 2007 cum laude aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam op een werkmethode voor een evenwichtige beoordeling door de rechter (waaronder de Ondernemingskamer) van het gedrag van ondernemende bestuurders.

Assink is verbonden aan het Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht, een wetenschappelijk studiecentrum op het gebied van het vennootschapsrecht, rechtspersonenrecht en ondernemingsrecht van de Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid van de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam en van de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. Hij is voor een dag per week als advocaat verbonden aan NautaDutilh in Amsterdam in de sectie corporate litigation, met een focus op de cassatiepraktijk.

Nadere informatie:

Persvoorlichting EUR, Sandra van Beek & René Quist, tel. (010) 408 1216,
e-mail: press@remove-this.eur.nl

dinsdag, 19 januari 2010

For the invitation go here. See you next Thursday in Rotterdam?

[No. 217] The Janus Head of Corporate Law

On Thursday January 21, 2010, I will accept my appointment as corporate law professor at the Erasmus University Rotterdam with an inaugural lecture called "The Janus Head of Corporate Law".

I am going to focus on the facilitating and regulating character of corporate law and try to connect corporate law with entrepreneurship.

The lecture, that is public (if you're interested, you're cordially invited), will begin at 11.00 hrs.; further information is available here.

[No. 193] The Legislature on Dividends: Changing Course?

In post 132 I briefly discussed the Bill that is currently pending before the Dutch Parliament regarding the simplification and flexibilisation of Dutch private company law. On October 26th 2009, the committee on legal affairs of the parliament (Vaste Commissie voor Justitie) consulted on the proposal with the Minister of Justice. It looks like an important aspect of the Bill will be amended. In my opinion, this is to be applauded.

The Bill aims to drastically reform the law on private companies. One of the most important changes proposed, is the abolition of the system of legal capital. The core concept of this system is the restriction of corporate activity by reference to the shareholders’ capital investment, as shown on the balance sheet. The system consists of rules concerning the raising of the corporation’s capital (prescribing a minimum level of equity capital which has to be invested by its shareholders) and maintaining this capital (restricting transfers of assets to shareholders where the net assets fall below the value of the equity capital invested).
    Nowadays, the system is considered to be cumbersome and archaic and it has been argued that it does not provide the intended protection to the corporation’s creditors. The legislature therefore abandons this ‘rule-based’ approach of creditor protection; the proposal gets rid of the requirement to provide a BV with a minimum of 18.000 euros of capital at incorporation. This departure of the system of minimum capital has not met much opposition. The Dutch legal community seems to agree that company law should remove the concept as soon as possible. (In Germany, a similar proposal did raise an intense debate. Although few German scholars or practitioners still believe that a minimum capital provides any protection to the company’s creditors, many of them argue that it constitutes a test of seriousness. ‘Wer kein Kapital einsetzen muss, handelt allzu oft nach dem Motto “erst gründen, dann nachdenken’.)

The Dutch proposal also amends the rules concerning the payment of dividends to the company’s shareholders. Contrary to the abolition of the minimum capital, this part of the proposal has met a considerable amount of criticism. Under current Dutch law, distributions have to satisfy a balance-sheet test; it is not allowed to distribute the company’s share capital. As the General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) has the power to resolve on distributions, the responsibility of the Board of Directors for these payments is not clear. However, case-law indicates that this does not imply that the directors do not bear any responsibility at all: in several cases, directors that had paid dividends prior to the company’s bankruptcy, have been held liable.  
    The bill replaces the balance-sheet test with a solvency approach. Distribution of dividends will primarily be subject to a liquidity/solvency-test. The par value of the capital may be distributed. Initially, the bill required the Board of Directors to perform a solvency test before approving a distribution. This test implied that the directors were obligated to check whether, after the distribution has been made, the company would continue to be able to pay its debts as they fall due. If the Board approved a distribution knowing that the payment failed this test, the directors could be held liable for the deficit. This rule threw some light on the role and responsibility of the Board with regards to dividends, without introducing a new liability risk, as directors can already be held liable for such payments.
    However, an amendment of the Proposal in February 2009 (Tweede Nota van Wijziging), deleted the boards’ right to approve the distribution and the formal requirement of a solvency test. The Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (known as VNO-NCW and the largest employers’ organization in the Netherlands) strongly objected to the increased role of the Board with respect to dividends. It feared extra liability risks for directors and argued that directors would experience pressure from shareholders if they tried to block a distribution. Since the GMS decides on distributions, it would be incoherent to provide the directors with a right of veto, it argued. These arguments do not seem to have convinced many scholars. The sudden change of the Department of Justice has met criticism in many legal articles, including one by me. I strongly doubt the existence of the perceived increase of liability risks and believe that the initial proposal is actually more coherent with the general duty that Dutch law imposes on directors. (For more in-depth arguments, see: WPNR 2009/6809, Dutch only.) Hence, I suggested that the legislature would reconsider its change of course.
    It looks like the parliament has picked up the vast amount of criticism. Many members of the committee on legal affairs have expressed their concerns regarding the amendment of the rules concerning distributions. (See the records of the recent consultation here, Dutch only.) As a result of the discussion, three Members of Parliament have proposed to amend the Bill; they suggest to undo the last amendment. In a reaction to this proposal, the Minister of Justice has declared to have “no strong objections” against this proposed change. It therefore seems likely that the boards’ right to approve distributions and the formal solvency test will be introduced again. This is, according to me, a step in the right direction.

[No. 189] Forces and Counterforces in Corporate Governance

On November 24 from 14 to 17 hrs., the Erasmus University Rotterdam will organize a symposium about Forces and Counterforces in Transparant Entrepreneurship.

Prof. Jean Frijns, former chairman of the Corporate Governance Committee that drafted the 2008 Dutch corporate governance code, will kick-off with a discussion about 'what works and what doesn't' corporate governance wise in listed companies. From the invitation:

De totstandkoming van goede corporate governance bij beursgenoteerde fondsen is niet vanzelfsprekend. In dit seminar bespreekt Professor Frijns, voormalig voorzitter van de Monitoring Commissie Corporate Governance, wat wel werkt en wat niet werkt. Omdat de belangen van betrokken partijen niet altijd hetzelfde zijn volgt op deze voordracht een debat over stellingen waarvan bekend is dat de panelleden tegenovergestelde meningen hebben en die de panelleden zelf hebben ingebracht. De aanwezige deelnemers worden in de gelegenheid gesteld om na de discussie per stelling te stemmen of zij het wel of niet met de stelling eens zijn.

This introduction will be followed by a panel discussion, involving J.M. Slagter (chairman of the VEB), R. Pieterse (chairman of the VEUO), H.W. Breukink (supervisory director at several listed companies), Prof. Geert Raaijmakers (VU) and J. van der Ende (chairman of Eumedion).

It's a promising set-up. Entry is free, the location is the M-Building at the EUR campus. Sign-up here.

[No. 180] Legal Demerger

Today, at 13.30 hrs CET, Harold Koster will defend his doctoral thesis about legal demerger at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. He analyzed this complex and technical field of law from a European and comparative perspective (including the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Japan, UK and US). Recommended reading for those interested in this field of law, especially practitioners in the M&A business.

[No. 141] Symposium: 50 Years European Corporate Law

Next Wednesday, September 30, the Dutch Institute for Corporate Law organizes a symposium about 50 years of European corporate law. The "50 years" part refers to the fact that Prof. P. Sanders, an important dean of the Erasmus University Rotterdam back in the day, formally accepted his position as professor at the university by delivering a speech about the European public corporation. Since then, there have been numerous developments in corporate law at the European level and "indirectly" at the national level in the European Union. As of 2004, for example, it is possible to establish a European public corporation.

The symposium takes place in the M-Building (Tokyo Wing) at the campus of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Further information about registration can be found here. The program runs as follows.

PROGRAMMA

12:45 – 13.30	Ontvangst met koffie/thee
13.30 – 13.35	Opening door dagvoorzitter mw. Prof. mr. H.M. Vletter - van Dort, Hoogleraar Bank- en Effectenrecht, Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam en Hoogleraar Effectenrecht, Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
13.35 – 13.50	Inleiding: Sanders’ Europese N.V. in perspectief Prof. mr. M.J. Kroeze, Decaan van de Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
13.50 – 14.30	De Europese vennootschap als sluis voor in- en uitvoer van ondernemingsrecht Prof. mr. J.W. Winter, Partner De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek en hoogleraar Internationaal Ondernemingsrecht, Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
14.30 – 14.45	Discussieronde
14.45 – 15.15	Thee/koffiepauze
15.15 – 15.55	Bestuurdersaansprakelijkheid in Europees perspectief Prof. mr. J.B. Wezeman, Hoogleraar Handelsrecht en Ondernemingsrecht, Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
16.55 – 16.35	Piet Sanders en de modernisering van de kunst, het recht en het (Europees) ondernemingsrecht Prof. mr. L. Timmerman, Hoogleraar grondslagen van het ondernemingsrecht, Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
16.35 – 16.50	Discussieronde
16.50	Afsluiting door dagvoorzitter en Borrel